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Phishing is that the act of making an attempt to accumulate data admire usernames, 
passwords, and master card details (and generally, indirectly, money) by masquerading as a 
trustworthy entity in associate degree transmission. Communications purporting to be 
from widespread social websites, auction sites, banks, on-line payment processors or 
IT directors square measure unremarkably would not to lure unsuspecting public. Phishing 
emails might contain links to websites that square measure infected with malware. 
Phishing is usually allotted by email spoofing or instant electronic communication, and 
it usually directs users to enter details at a pretend web site whose look and feel square 
measure virtually similar to the legitimate one. During this paper, we tend 
to propose a replacement end-host based mostly anti-phishing algorithmic program that we 
tend to decision LinkGuard, by utilizing the generic characteristics of the hyperlinks in 
phishing attacks. These characteristics square measure derived by analyzing the 
phishing information archive provided by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG). 
Because it is supported the generic characteristics of phishing attacks, 
LinkGuard will find not solely familiar, however, additionally unknown phishing attacks. We 
have got enforced LinkGuard in Windows XP. Our experiments verified that LinkGuard is 
effective to find and forestall each familiar and unknown phishing attacks 
with borderline false negatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The word `Phishing' at first emerged in 
Nineties. The first hackers typically use 
`ph' to switch `f' to supply new words 
within the hacker's community, since they 
sometimes hack by phones. Phishing 
could be a new word created from 
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assailant attract users to go to a faked data 
processor by causation them faked e-mails 
(or instant messages), and stealthily get 
victim's personal info equivalent to user 
name, password, and national security ID, 
etc. This info then will be used for future 
target advertisements or maybe fraud 
attacks (e.g., transfer cash from victims' 
bank account). 
 
The often used attack technique is to send 
e-mails to potential victims that looked as 
if it would be sent by banks, on-line 
organizations, or ISPs. In these e-mails, 
they are going to frame some causes, e.g. 
the secret of your master card had been 
mis-entered for several times, or they are 
providing upgrading services, to attract 
you visit their information processing 
system to evolve or modify your account 
variety and secret through the link pro-
vided within the e-mail. You may then be 
connected to a counterfeited information 
processing system when clicking those 
links. The style, the functions performed, 
typically even the address of those faked 
websites are just like the important 
information processing system. It is very 
troublesome for you to grasp that you just 
are literally visiting a malicious web site. 
If you input the account variety and secret, 
the attackers then with success collect the 
knowledge at the server aspect, and is in a 
position to perform their next step actions 
thereupon data (e.g., withdraw cash out 
from your account). 
 
Phishing itself is not a brand new 
construct, however, it is more and more 
utilized by phishers to steal user info and 
perform business crime in recent years. At 
intervals one to 2 years, the amount of 
phishing attacks inflated dramatically. in 
line with Gartner opposition., for the 
twelve months ending Gregorian calendar 
month 2004, “there were 1.8 million 
phishing attack victims, and, therefore, the 
fraud incurred by phishing victims 
destroyed $1.2 billion” [1–6]. According 
to the statistics provided by the Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APWG), in 
March 2006, the total number of unique 
phishing reports submitted to the APWG 
was 18,480; and the top three phishing site 
hosting countries are, the United States 
(35.13%), China (11.93%), and the 
Republic of Korea (8.85%) [2]. The 
infamous phishing attacks happened in 
China in recent years include the events to 
counterfeit the Bank of China (real Web 
site www.bank-of-china.com, 
counterfeited Web site www.bank-off-
china.com), the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (real Web site 
www.icbc.com.cn, faked web site 
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of China (real website www.95599.com, 
faked Web site www.965555.com), etc. 
 
In this paper, we study the common 
procedure of phishing attacks and review 
possible anti-phishing approaches. We 
then focus on end-host based anti-phishing 
approach. We first analyze the common 
characteristics of the hyperlinks in 
phishing e-mails. Our analysis identifies 
that the phishing hyperlinks share one or 
more characteristics as listed below:  
 The visual link and, therefore, the 
actual link are not identical.  
 The attackers usually use dotted 
decimal scientific discipline address 
rather than DNS name.  
 Special tricks area unit accustomed 
write the hyperlinks maliciously.  
 The attackers typically use faux DNS 
names that area unit similar (but not 
identical) with the target electronic 
computer. 
 
We then propose associate degree end-
host primarily based anti-phishing 
algorithmic program that we have a 
tendency to decision LinkGuard, 
supported the characteristics of the 
phishing link. Since LinkGuard is 
character-based, it will notice and forestall 
not solely proverbial phishing attacks, 
however, conjointly unknown ones.  
 
PHISHING ATTACK PROCEDURE 
AND PREVENTION METHODS 
In this paper, we assume that phishers use 
e-mail as their major method to carry out 
phishing attacks. Nonetheless, our analysis 
and algorithm can be applied to attacks 




The Procedure of Phishing Attacks 
In general, phishing attacks are performed 
with the following four steps: 
 Phishers found out a counterfeited 
information processing system that 
appearance specifically just like the 
legitimate information processing 
system, together with fitting the 
internet server, applying the DNS 
server name, and making the online 
pages the same as the destination 
internet site, etc. 
 Send great deal of spoofed e-mails to 
focus on users within the name of 
these legitimate corporations and 
organizations, attempting to persuade 
the potential victims to go to their 
websites. 
 Receivers receive the e-mail, open it, 
click the spoofed hyperlink in the e-
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information. 
 Phishers steal the personal data and 
perform their fraud akin to transferring 
cash from the victims' account. 
 
Approaches to Prevent Phishing 
Attacks 
Enhance the Security of the Web Sites 
The business websites resembling the 
online sites of banks will take new 
strategies to ensure the security of users' 
personal info. One technique to boost the 
safety is to use hardware devices. 
Parenthetically, the Barclays bank 
provides a hand-held card reader to the 
users. Before searching within the internet, 
users ought to insert their mastercard into 
the cardboard reader, and input their 
(personal identification number) PIN code, 
then the cardboard reader can turn out a 
once security parole, users will perform 
transactions solely when the proper parole 
is input [7–12]. Another technique is to 
use the biometry characteristic (e.g., voice, 
fingerprint, iris, etc.) for user 
authentication. Parenthetically, Paypal had 
tried to interchange the only parole 
verification by voice recognition to boost 
the safety of the online website. With 
these strategies, the phishers cannot 
accomplish their tasks even when they 
have gotten half of the victims' info. 
However, all these techniques want extra 
hardware to understand the authentication 
between the users and also the internet 
sites, thence can increase the value and 
produce sure inconvenience. Therefore, it 
still wants time for these techniques to be 
wide adopted. 
 
Block the Phishing E-Mails by Various 
Spam Filters 
Phishers typically use e-mails as `bait' to 
attract potential victims. SMTP (Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol) is that the 
protocol to deliver e-mails within the web 
[11]. It is a really straightforward protocol 
that lacks necessary authentication 
mechanisms. Data regarding sender, adore 
the name and email. 
 
There are several (technical or non-
technical) ways to prevent phishing 
attacks:  
1) Educate users to understand how 
phishing attacks work and be alert when 
phishing-alike e- mails are received. 
2) Use legal methods to punish phishing 
attackers. 3) Use technical methods to stop 
phishing attackers.  
 
In this paper, we only focus on the third 
one. Technically, if we can cut off one or 
several of the steps that needed by a 
phishing attack, we then successfully 
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briefly review these approaches. 
 
Detect and Block the Phishing Web 
Sites in Time 
If we will cite the phishing websites in 
time, we tend to then will block the sites 
and forestall phishing attacks. It is 
comparatively simple to (manually) 
confirm whether or not a web site could be 
a phishing site or not, however, it is 
troublesome to seek out that phishing sites 
call at time. The Web address of the 
sender, route of the message, etc., will be 
counterfeited in SMTP. Thus, the attackers 
will channel massive amounts of spoofed 
e-mails that area unit appeared from 
legitimate organizations. The phishers 
hide their identities once causation the 
spoofed e-mails, therefore, if anti-spam 
systems will confirm whether or not an e-
mail is distributed by the declared sender 
(Am I Whom I Say I Am?), the phishing 
attacks are going to be decreased 
dramatically. From this time, the 
techniques that preventing senders from 
counterfeiting their Send ID (e.g., SIDF of 
Microsoft) will defeat phishing attacks 
with efficiency [8]. 
 
SIDF could be a combination of 
Microsoft's display for E-mail and, 
therefore, the SPF (Sender Policy 
Framework) developed by Meng Weng 
Wong [13]. Each display and SPF check 
e-mail sender's name to verify if the e-
mail is distributed from a server that is 
licensed to send e-mails of that domain, 
and from that to see whether or not that e-
mail use spoofed e-mail address. If it is 
faked, the web service supplier will then 
verify that e-mail could be a spam e-mail 
 
The spoofed e-mails employed by phishers 
are one kind of spam e-mails. From this 
time of read, the spam filters may also be 
wont to filter those phishing e-mails [1, 4]. 
For instance, blacklist, whitelist, keyword 
filters, Bayesian filters wit h self-learning 
talents, and E-Mail Stamp, etc., will all be 
used at the e-mail server or consumer 
systems. Most of those anti-spam 
techniques perform filtering at the 
receiving facet by scanni nanogram the 
contents and also the address of the 
received e-mails. And they all have pros 
and cons as discussed below. Blacklist and 
whitelist cannot work if the names of the 
spamers are not known in advance. 
Keyword filter and Bayesian filters can 
detect spam based on content, hence can 
detect unknown spasm. But they can also 
result in false positives and false 
negatives. Furthermore, spam filters are 
designed for general spam e-mails and 
may not very suitable for filtering 
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not consider the specific characteristics of 
phishing attacks. 
 
Install Online Anti-Phishing Software 
in User's Computers 
Despite all the above efforts, it is still 
possible for the users to visit the spoofed 
Web sites. As a last defense, users can 
install anti-phishing tools in their 
computers. The anti-phishing tools in use 
today can be divided into two categories: 
blacklist/whitelist based and rule-based. 
 
Category I 
When a user visits a Web site, the anti-
phishing tool searches the address of that 
site in a blacklist stored in the database. If 
the visited site is on the list, the anti-
phishing tool then warns the users. Tools 
in this category include ScamBlocker from 
the EarthLink company, PhishGuard, and 
Netcraft, etc. [5, 9, 10]. Though the 
developers of these tools all announced 
that they can update the blacklist in time, 
they cannot prevent the attacks from the 
newly emerged (unknown) phishing sites.  
 
Category II 
This class of tools uses bound rules in 
their package, and checks the protection of 
an online web site in step with these rules. 
Samples of this sort of tools embrace 
SpoofGuard developed by Stanford, 
TrustWatch of the GeoTrust etc. [3, 7]. 
SpoofGuard checks the name, address 
(includes the port number) of an online 
web site, it additionally checks whether or 
not the browser is directed to this address 
via the links within the contents of e-
mails. If it finds that the name of the 
visited computing machine is comparable 
to a widely known name, or if they are not 
victimisation the quality port, SpoofGuard 
can warn the users. In TrustWatch, the 
safety of an internet website is decided by 
whether or not it is been reviewed by 
associate in nursing freelance sure third 
party organization. Each SpoofGuard and 
TrustWatch give a toolbar within the 
browsers to apprise their users whether or 
not the net website is verified and sure. It 
is straightforward to watch that everyone 
the higher than defense ways are helpful 
and complementary to every different, 
however, none of them are excellent at the 
present stage. Within the remainder of the 
paper, we tend to specialize in end-host 
primarily based approach associate in 
nursing propose an end-host based 
LinkGuard algorithmic program for 
phishing detection and interference. To 
this end, our work follows the same 
approach as [3]. Our work differs from in 
that: 1) LinkGuard is based on our careful 
analysis of the characteristics of phishing 
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like a framework. 
2) LinkGuard has a verified very low false 
negative rate for unknown phishing 
attacks whereas the false negative property 
of SpoofGuard is still not known. 
 
LINKGUARD 
Classification of the Hyperlinks in the 
Phishing E-Mails 
In order to (illegally) collect useful 
information from po-tential victims, 
phishers generally tries to convince the 
users to click the hyperlink embedded in 
the phishing e-mail. A hyperlink has a 
structure as follows. 
 
<a href="URI"> Anchor text <\a> 
where `URI' (universal resource 
identifiers) provides the n ec-essary 
information needed for the user to access 
the net-worked resource and `Anchor text' 
is the text that will be displayed in user's 
Web browser. Examples of URIs are 
http://www.google.com, 
https://www.icbc.com.cn/login.html, 
ftp://61.112.1.90:2345, etc. `Anchor text' 
in general is used to display information 
related to the URI to help the user to better 
understand the resources provided by the 
hyperlink. In the following hyperlink, the 
URI links to the phishing archives 
provided by the APWG group, and its 
anchor text “Phishing Archive” informs 




Phishing Archive </a> 
Note that the content of the URI will not 
be displayed in user's Web browser. 
Phishers, therefore, can utilize this fact to 
play trick in their `bait' e-mails. In the rest 
of the paper, we call the URI in the 
hyperlink the actual link and the anchor 
text the visual link. After analyzing the 
203 (there are altogether 210 phishing e-
mails, with 7 of them with incomplete 
information or with malware attachment 
and do not have hyperlinks) phishing e-
mail archives from Sep. 21st 2003 to July 
4th 2005 provided by APWG [6]. We 
classified the hyperlinks used in the 
phishing e-mail into the following 
categories: 
1) The hyperlink provides DNS domain 
names in the anchor text, but the 
destination DNS name in the visible 
link does not match that in the actual 
link. For instance, the following 
hyperlink:  




gon/</a>appears to be linked to 
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of a bank, but it actually is linked to a 
phishing site www.profusenet.net.  
2) Dotted decimal IP address is used 
directly in the URI or the anchor text 
instead of DNS name. See below for an 
example.  




UsingSSL=1” > SIGN IN</a> 
3) The hyperlink is counterfeited 
maliciously by using certain encoding 
schemes. There are two cases:  
a) The link is formed by encoding 
alphabets into their corresponding 
ASCII codes. See below for such a 
hyperlink.  




Table 1: The Categories of Hyperlinks in Phishing E-Mails. 
Category Number of Links Percentage 
1 90 44.33% 
2 85 41.87% 
3.a 19 9.36% 
3.b 16 7.88% 
4 67 33% 
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%34%31:%34%39%30%33/%6C/%69%6
E%64%65%78 %2E%68%74%6D” > 
www.citibank.com </a> 
while this link is seemed pointed 
www.citibank.com, it actually points to 
http://4.34.195.41:34/l/index.htm. 
b) Special characters (e.g. @ in the visible 
link) are used to fool the user to believe 
that the e-mail is from a trusted sender. 
For instance, the following link seems is 
linked to amazon, but it actually is linked 
to IP address 69.10.142.34. 
http://www.amazon.com:fvthsgbljhfcs83in
foupdate @69.10.142.34. 
4) The link does not offer destination info in 
its anchor text and uses DNS names in its 
URI. The DNS name within the URI 
typically is comparable with a famed 
company or organization. Let us say, the 
subsequent link looks to be sent from 
paypal, however, it truly is not. Since 
paypal-cgi is actually registered by the 
phisher to let the users believe that it has 
something to do with paypal  
<a href= “http://www.paypal-
cgi.us/webscr.php?cmd=LogIn” > Click 
here to confirm your account  
</a> 
5) The attackers utilize the vulnerabilities of 
the target Web site to redirect users to 
their phishing sites or to launch CSS 
(cross site scripting) attacks. For example, 




Click here <a> Once clicked, will redirect 
the user to the phishing site 
200.251.251.10 due to a vulnerability of 
usa.visa.com.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the number of 
hyperlinks and their percentages for all the 
categories. It is ascertained that almost all 
of the phishing e-mails use faked DNS 
names (category 1, 44.33%) or dotted 
decimal science addresses (category 2, 
41.87%). cryptography tricks are of t 
times used (category 3a and 3b, 17.24%). 
And phishing attackers usually attempt to 
fool users by putting in DNS names that 
area unit terribly similar with the $64000 
e-commence sites or by not providing 
destination data within the anchor text 
(category 4). Phishing attacks that utilize 
the vulnerability of websites (category 5) 
area unit of little variety (2%) and that we 
leave this sort of attacks for future study. 
Note that a phishing hyperlink can belong 
to several categories at the same time. For 
instance, an attacker may use tricks from 
both categories 1 and 3 at the same time to 
increase his success chance. Hence, the 
sum of percentages is larger than 1. Once 
the characteristics of the phishing 
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design anti-phishing algorithms that can 
detect known or unknown phishing attacks 
in real-time. We present our LinkGuard 
algorithm in the next subsection. 
 
The LinkGuard Algorithm 
LinkGuard works by analyzing the 
differences between the visual link and the 
actual link. It also calculates the 
similarities of a URI with a known trusted 
site. The following terminologies are used 
in the algorithm. 
v_link: visual link; a_link: actual_link; 
v_dns: visual DNS name; a_dns: actual 
DNS name; 
sender_dns: sender’s DNS name. 
int LinkGuard(v_link, a_link} { 
1. v_dns = GetDNSName(v_link);  
2. a_dns = GetDNSName(a_link);  
3. if ((v_dns and a_dns are not  
4. empty) and (v_dns != a_dns))  
5. return PHISHING;  
6. if (a_dns is dotted decimal)  
7. return POSSIBLE_PHISHING;  
8. if(a_link or v_link is encoded)  
9. {  
10. v_link2 = decode (v_link);  
11. a_link2 = decode (a_link);  
12. return LinkGuard(v_link2, a_link2);  
13. }  
14. /* analyze the domain name for  
15. possible phishing */  
16. if(v_dns is NULL)  
17. return AnalyzeDNS(a_link);  
18. } 
 
The LinkGuard algorithm works as 
follows. In its main routine LinkGuard, it 
first extracts the DNS names from the 
actual and the visual links (lines 1 and 2). 
It then compares the actual and visual 
DNS names, if these names are not the 
same, then it is phishing of category 1 
(lines 3-5). If dotted decimal IP address is 
directly used in actual dns, it is then a 
possible phishing attack of category 2 
(lines 6 and 7). We will delay the 
discussion of how to handle possible 
phishing attacks later. If the actual link or 
the visual link is encoded 
int AnalyzeDNS (actual_link) { 
/* Analyze the actual DNS name according to 
the blacklist and whitelist*/ 
1. if (actual_dns in blacklist)  
2. return PHISHING;  
3. if (actual_dns in whitelist)  
4. return NOTPHISHING;  
5. return PatternMatching(actual_link);  
6. }  
7. int PatternMatching(actual_link){ 
 
8. if (sender_dns and actual_dns are 
different)  
 
9. return POSSIBLE_PHISHING;  
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11. {  
12. bv = Similarity(prev_dns, actual_link);  
13. if (bv == true)  
14. return POSSIBLE_PHISHING;  
15. }  
16. return NO_PHISHING;  
17. } 
 
18. float Similarity (str, actual_link) { 32 
if (str is part of actual_link) 
19. return true;  
20. int maxlen = the maximum string  
21. lengths of str and actual_dns;  
22. int minchange = the minimum number 
of  
23. changes needed to transform str  
24. to actual_dns (or vice verse);  
25. if (thresh<(maxlen-
minchange)/maxlen<1)  
26. return true  
27. return false;  
28. } 
 
(Categories 3 and 4), we first decode the 
links, then recursiv ely call LinkGuard to 
return a result (lines 8-13). When there is 
no destination information (DNS name or 
dotted IP address) in the visual link 
(category 5), LinkGuard calls 
AnalyzeDNS to analyze the actual dns 
(lines 16 and 17). LinkGuard, therefore, 
handles all the 5 categories of phishing 
attacks. In AnalyzeDNS, if the actual dns 
name is contained in the blacklist, then we 
are sure that it is a phishing attack (lines 
18 and 19). Similarly, if the actual dns is 
contained in the whitelist, it is, therefore, 
not a phishing attack (lines 20 and 21). If 
the actual dns is not contained in either 
whitelist or blacklist, PatternMatching is 
then invoked (line 22). 
 
PatternMatching is designed to handle 
unknown attacks (blacklist/whitelist is 
useless in this case). For category 5 of the 
phishing attacks, all the information we 
have is the actual link from the hyperlink 
(since the visual link does not contain 
DNS or IP address of the destination site), 
which provide very little information for 
further analysis. In order to resolve this 
problem, we try two methods: First, we 
extract the sender e-mail address from the 
e-mail. Since phishers generally try to fool 
users by using (spoofed) legal DNS names 
in the sender e-mail address, we expect 
that the DNS name in the sender address 
will be different from that in the actual 
link. Second, we proactively collect DNS 
names that are manually input by the user 
when she surfs the Internet and store the 
names into a seed set, and since these 
names are input by the user by hand, we 
assume that these names are trustworthy. 
PatternMatching then checks if the actual 
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the DNS name in the sender's address 
(lines 23 and 24), and if it is quite similar 
(but not identical) with one or more names 
in the seed set by invoking the Similarity 
(lines 25-30) procedure. 
 
Similarity checks the most chance of 
actual dns and also the DNS names in seed 
set. The similarity index between 2 strings 
is set by scheming the borderline range of 
changes (including insertion, deletion, or 
revision of a personality within the string) 
required to rework a string to the opposite 
string. If the amount of changes is zero, 
then the 2 strings square measure 
identical; if the amount of changes is little, 
then they are of high similarity; otherwise, 
they are of low similarity. For example, 
the similarity index of `microsoft' and 
`micr0s0ft' is 7/9 (since we need change 
the 2 `0's in micr0s0ft to `o'. Similarly, the 
similarity index of `paypal' and `paypal-
cgi' is 6/10 (since we need to remove the 
last 4 chars from paypal-cgi), and the 
similarity index of `95559' and `955559' is 
5/6 (since we need to insert a `5' to change 
`95559' to `955559'). 
 
If the two DNS names are similar but not 
identical, then it is a possible phishing 
attack. For instance, PatternMatching can 
easily detect the difference between 
www.icbc.com.cn (which is a good e-
commence web site) and 
www.1cbc.com.cn (which is a phishing 
site), which has similarity index 75%. 
Note that PatternMatching may treat 
www.1cbc.com.cn as a normal site if the 
user had never visit www.1cbc.com.cn 
before. This false negative, however, is 
unlikely to cause any severe privacy or 
financial lose to the user, since she 
actually does not have anything to lose 
regarding the Web site www.icbc.com.cn 
(since she never visits that Web site 
before)! 
 
False Positives and False Negatives 
Handling 
Since LinkGuard is a rule-based heuristic 
algorithm, it may cause false positives 
(i.e., treat non-phishing site as phishing 
site) and false negatives (i.e., treat 
phishing site as non-phishing site). In 
what follows, we show that LinkGuard 
may result in false positives but is very 
unlikely to cause harmful false negatives. 
 
For phishing attacks of category 1, we are 
sure that there is no false positive or false 
negatives, since the DNS names of the 
visual and actual links are not the same. It 
is also easy to observe that LinkGuard 
handles categories 3 and 4 correctly since 
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For category 2, LinkGuard could end in 
false positives, since victimisation dotted 
decimal science addresses rather than 
domain names could also be fascinating in 
some special circumstances (e.g., once the 
DNS names square measure still not 
registered). For category 5, LinkGuard 
may additionally end in false positives. To 
illustrate, we all know that each 
`www.iee.org' and `www.ieee.org' square 
measure legal internet sites. However, 
these 2 DNS names have a similarity 
index of 3/4, thus, is extremely possible to 
trigger a false positive. 
 
When it is a possible false positive, 
LinkGuard will return a Possible Phishing. 
In our implementation (which will be 
described in the next section), we leverage 
the user to judge if it is a phishing attack 
by prompting a dialogue box with detailed 
information of the hyperlink. The rationale 
behind this choice is that users generally 
may have more knowledge of a link than a 
computer in certain circumstances (e.g., 
the user may know that the dotted decimal 
IP address is the address of his friend's 
computer and that www.iee.org is a 
respected site for electrical engineers). For 
category 5, LinkGuard may also result in 
false negatives. False negatives are more 
harmful than false positives, since 
attackers in this case will succeed in 
leading the victim to the phishing sites. 
For instance, when the sender's e-mail 
address and the DNS name in the actual 
link are the same and the DNS name in the 
actual link has a very low similarity index 
with the target site, LinkGuard will return 
No Phishing. For instance, 
PatternMatching will treat the below link 
as No Phishing. 
<a href="http://fdic-secure.com/ 
application.htm"> Click here </a> 
with “securehq@fdic-secure.com” as the 
sender address. 
 
We note that this kind of false negatives is 
very unlikely to result in information 
leakage, since the end user is very unlikely 
to have information the attack interested 
(since the DNS name in this link is not 
similar with any legal Web sites). 
 
IMPLEMENTATION AND 
VERIFICATION OF LINKGUARD 
We have implemented the LinkGuard 
algorithm in Windows XP. It includes two 
parts: a whook.dll dynamic library and a 
LinkGuard executive. The structure of the 
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Fig. 1: The Structure of the LinkGuard 
Implementation, which Consists of a 
whook.dll and a LinkGuard Executive. 
 
whook is a dynamic link library, it is 
dynamically loaded into the address 
spaces of the executing processes by the 
operating system. whook is responsible for 
collecting data, such as the called links 
and visual links, the user input URLs. 
More specifically, whook.dll is used to: 1) 
install a BHO (browser helper object) for 
IE to monitor user input URLs; 2) install 
an event hook with the SetWinEventHook 
provided by the Windows operating 
system to collect relevant information; 3) 
retrieve sender's e-mail address from 
Outlook; 4) analyze and filter the received 
windows and browser events passed by 
the BHO and the hook, and pass the 
analyzed data to the LinkGuard executive. 
 
LinkGuard is the key component of the 
implementation. It is a standalone 
windows program with GUI (graphic user 
interface). It is composed of 5 parts as 
illustrated in Figure 1: Analyzer, Alerter, 
Logger, Comm, and Database. The 




Communicate with the whook.dll of all of 
the monitored processes, collect data 
related to user input from other processes 
(e.g., IE, outlook, firefox, etc.), and send 
these data to the Analyzer, it can also send 
commands (such as block the phishing 
sites) from the LinkGuard executive to 
whook.dll. The communication between 
the LinkGuard process and other processes 
is realized by the shared memory 








It is the key component of LinkGuard, 
whichimplements the LinkGuard 
algorithm. It uses data provided by Comm 
and Database, and sends the results to the 
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Alerter 
When receiving warning messages from 
Ana-lyzer, it shows the related 
information to alert the users and send 




Archive the history information, such as 
userevents, alert information, for future 
use. 
 
After implemented the LinkGuard system, 
we have designed experiments to verify 
the effectiveness of our algorithm. Since, 
we are interested in testing LinkGuard's 
ability to detect unknown phishing attacks, 
we set both whitelist and blacklist to 
empty in our experiments. Our 
experiments showed that PhishgGuard can 
detect 195 phishing attacks out of the 203 
APWG archives (with detection rate 
96%). For the 8 unde-tected attacks, 4 
attacks utilize certain Web site 
vulnerabilities. Hence the detecting rate is 
higher than 96% if category 5 is not 
included. Our experiment also showed that 
our implementation used by small amount 
of CPU time and memory space of the 
system. In a computer with 1.6G Pentium 
CPU and 512MB memory, our 
implementation consumes less than 1% 
CPU time and its memory footprint is less 
than 7MB. 
 
Our experiment only used the phishing 
archive provided by APWG as the attack 
sources. We are planning to use 
LinkGuard in daily life to further evaluate 
and validate its effectiveness. Since we 
believe that a hybrid approach may be 
more effective for phihsing defense, we 
are also planning to include a mechanism 




Phishing has changing into a significant 
network security downside, inflicting 
fastidious lose of billions of greenbacks to 
each customers and e-commerce firms. 
And maybe additional basically, phishing 
has created e-commerce distrusted and 
fewer enticing to traditional customers. 
During this paper, we have studied the 
characteristics of the hyperlinks that were 
embedded in phishing e-mails. We have a 
tendency to then designed associate anti-
phishing rule, Link-Guard, supported the 
derived characteristics. Since Phishig-
Guard is characteristic primarily based, it 
cannot solely sight identified attacks, 
however, is also effective to the unknown 
ones. We have enforced LinkGuard for 
Windows XP. Our experiment showed 
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find up to ninety six unknown phishing 
attacks in time period. We tend to believe 
that LinkGuard is not solely helpful for 
detective work phishing attacks, however 
can also defend users from malicious or 
unsought links in sites and Instant 
messages. Our future work includes more 
extending the LinkGuard algorithmic rule, 
in order that it will handle CSS (cross 
website scripting) attacks. 
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